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Abstract 
This essay begins by asking why Rorty would endorse a physicalist agenda which, on the 
face of it, ran counter to his aims in philosophy; and concludes both that his motivation was 
confused, and that he failed to detach physicalism from metaphysics and scienticism. I begin 
by showing the importance of metaphilosophy to Rorty’s position on consciousness, and the 
centrality of consciousness to his overall project. I then summarise Rorty’s position, which 
was essentially derived from Ryle, but uniquely driven by metaphilosophy. My assessment 
begins by disputing Rorty’s thesis about the historical origins of the concept of 
consciousness, before following him into his favourite argumentative territory by talking 
about the social utility of first-person reflection on consciousness, and his own motivations 
for wanting to undermine such reflection. I conclude that because of his obsession with 
religion, Rorty became entangled in a scientistic agenda he should have opposed. 
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1. The Odd Physicalist Out 
 
These days, Rorty’s name is most associated with his postmodern (he would say pragmatist) 
rejection of objective truth, and attempt to blur the boundaries between philosophy and 
literature. In the 1960s and ‘70s it was most associated with his philosophy of mind. That 
Rorty did not abandon his interest in philosophy of mind, however, is indicated by the fact 
that the book which enacted the transition between his earlier and later images, namely 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, both begins with, and argumentatively hinges upon, an 
attempt to deconstruct modern conceptions of mind, and in particular, consciousness. 
Moreover, consciousness was an issue Rorty regularly returned to thereafter; it figures 
prominently in the final collection of his papers, for instance, where we find him reflecting on 
the contemporary debate led by David Chalmers. This was not a lingering, nostalgic interest 
in the kind of debates he was once prominent within. Rather, his views on truth, 
metaphilosophy and consciousness were all intimately linked. Consciousness was a 
philosophical issue Rorty felt he needed to discredit, in order to pave the way to his views on 
truth and metaphilosophy. Those views became increasingly prominent in defending his 
position on consciousness, and in the end, there was just a unified package; but consciousness 
provided Rorty’s means of breaking into that hermeneutic circle.  
 
Rorty’s philosophy of consciousness is part of a physicalist tradition that stems from Ryle; as 
is Dennett’s, of which Rorty enthusiastically approved. Detractors of this tradition accuse it 
of “eliminativism”, which derives from the label James Cornman coined for Rorty’s position, 
and which Rorty embraced for a time. But it is now a term of abuse in some quarters; an 
attitude Galen Strawson writes large when he says that consciousness eliminativism is “surely 
the strangest thing that has ever happened in the whole history of human thought, not just in 
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the whole history of philosophy”, adding that it is, “the silliest view ever put forward” 
(Strawson 2008: 6). I know what he means; on the face of it, my current situation – looking at 
the computer screen and thinking about what to write – provides ample reason to think that 
consciousness could never be eliminated from a credible world-view. The particles physicists 
currently talk about seem far more likely candidates for eventual elimination, given how 
much physics has changed over the centuries; but experiences, like tables and chairs, seem 
ineliminable simply because they number among the manifest realities which science and 
other disciplines set out to explain. So why did Rorty endorse this view? 
 
We will not find the usual physicalist motivation, namely that everything is physical, and so 
either consciousness is too, or else is an illusion. And that raises the question: why would 
Rorty commit to an agenda which, on the face of it, is set by goals diametrically opposed to 
his own? For consciousness provides the main obstacle to physicalist ontology; to a 
metaphysical conception of the world as essentially physical. As Putnam once said, 
physicalism is the only metaphysical view with “contemporary ‘clout’” (Putnam 1983: 208), 
and that is why the issue is so hard fought within philosophy; physicalists want to overcome 
the apparent obstacle of consciousness, so they can keep their work in step with science and 
help to demystify the world. Given that Rorty’s goal was to eradicate metaphysics, and free 
us from the kind of scientism that privileges the vocabulary of physics over others, then, it 
might seem rather puzzling that Rorty was with the physicalists. In line with his pluralism, 
should he not have welcomed this obstacle to the last bastion of metaphysics, deplored the 
scientism behind attempts to overcome it, and insisted that talk of conscious experiences is as 
legitimate as talk of anything else? Should he not have said that efforts to show that discourse 
about mind can be reconciled with an exclusively physical discourse, are a paradigmatically 
philosophical waste of effort? That they are misguided attempts to make different discourses 
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commensurable, in order to satisfy the demands of metaphysical ontology to privilege one, 
and then reconcile all others to it?1   
  
Rorty, however, thought the Rylean tradition  provided “one of the few clear instances of 
intellectual progress which analytic philosophy has to its credit” (Rorty 1991a: 3). To 
understand why he thought this, we must turn to his metaphilosophy. For what makes Rorty a 
unique philosopher of consciousness is that his position is metaphilosophically driven; 
explicitly so. He never wasted an opportunity to turn debates about consciousness around to 
metaphilosophy – to the motivations of philosophers who oppose physicalism, and to his own 
purportedly better, more historically attuned, motivations. This should come as no surprise, 
given that Rorty thought “substantial philosophical doctrines” were “inseparable” from 
“metaphilosophical issues – issues about what, if anything, philosophy is good for and about 
how it is best pursued” (Rorty 2007: 122). To understand the motivation for his position, 
then, and indeed what it amounts to, we need to see how it connects with his metaphilosophy. 
  
2. Rorty’s Position 
 
Rorty’s position has two integrated components. The first consists in making the case that the 
language of natural science is capable of incorporating consciousness. Thus he is happy to 
endorse Frank Jackon’s statement that “if you duplicate our world in all physical respects and 
stop right there, you duplicate it in all respects” (Rorty 2007: 176). Of course, many 
philosophers would accept this, and hence call themselves “physicalists”, while still thinking 
that consciousness presents an obstacle to scientific understanding; that there is an 
“explanatory gap”, as Joseph Levine (1983) puts it, between our microstructural 
understanding of the brain and our first-person conceptions of conscious states. Rorty, 
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however, thinks these are just different ways of talking that can be easily reconciled; he has 
no patience with “defeatist guff” about the “limits of science” (Rorty 1998: 120). This first-
order, more purely philosophical component of his position is entirely in-line with the Rylean 
tradition, and hence not terribly original. In fact, Rorty regarded distinctions within that 
tradition as essentially trivial; behaviourists, identity theorists and functionalists, he drolly 
says, “had very little to disagree about, but managed it nevertheless” (Rorty 1982a: 333).  
 
What sets Rorty apart is that he wanted to detach physicalism from ontology and scientism. 
So he does not think the ability of physics to describe everything in micro-structural terms 
shows that it thereby captures the ultimate nature of reality, and consequently should be 
privileged as the area of culture uniquely capable of telling us what is actually out there in the 
world. This difference stems from the second, metaphilosophical component of his position, 
which consists in explaining why we should welcome the idea of an exclusively physical 
description of ourselves, and why resistance to it is badly motivated. Both explanations have 
the same root. Thus the reason purely physical descriptions are to be welcomed is that they 
distance us from the idea that there is an objective truth we can anchor our contingent 
conversations to, and to which we might turn for ahistorical guidance; the idea that we are 
alone in the universe without supernatural help went “hand-in-hand with the admission that 
Democritus and Epicurus had been largely right about how the universe works” (Rorty 2007: 
147). While the reason the apparent obstacle of consciousness to universal physical 
description has been invested with philosophical significance, as Rorty sees it, is exactly 
because of such hopes for a guiding objective truth.  
 
Persuading us to abandon essentialism, intrinsicality, and hence ahistorical, objective truth, 
was the overarching aim of Rorty’s philosophical career. So since he saw the mind as the 
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“last refuge of intrinsicality” (Rorty 1998: 110), it was crucial to his project to show it to be 
just as much a relational node within our culturally constructed web of belief as anything 
else; that it was just something we talk about, and could talk about in various ways, including 
physical. Ways of talking about consciousness which allude to an intrinsic nature resistant to 
physical description thus needed to be abandoned, and Rorty’s efforts to persuade us to do 
this are an exercise in “cultural politics”, on a par with efforts to discourage racial, 
nationalist, or theological terminology (Rorty 2007: 3ff.). However, in addition to promoting 
the demystifying language of physicalism, Rorty also needed to show that it does not have 
positive metaphysical implications of its own; otherwise his project would backfire. And this 
is the balancing act Rorty’s philosophy of consciousness tries to perform. It is essentially an 
endeavour to harness the anti-metaphysical force of a universal physical vocabulary, while 
discouraging any rebound into physicalist metaphysics. 
 
With hindsight, at least, Rorty’s direction of travel was clear in his first published works, and 
his subsequent writings simply developed and refined his position. Thus in 1963, we find him 
arguing that empiricism and extensionalism are unobjectionable, so long as they are held 
apart from the reductionist project of constructing a unitary language adequate to the world; 
the latter being infected by Sellars’s “Myth of the Given” (Rorty 2014: 96ff.). This was a first 
effort to separate worthy ambitions for a universal scientific language, from metaphysical 
ambitions. Then in 1965 (ibid.: 106ff.), in his influential paper advocating eliminative 
materialism, we find him arguing that talk of conscious sensations, just like talk of tables, 
will probably always be with us, due to its convenience over talking about complex 
microphysical configurations. However, since this is a matter of convenience rather than 
principle, such talk need not always be with us; which is all physicalism needs to establish. 
Here we see clearly that all that ever concerned Rorty in this area, was showing that 
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consciousness lacks an intrinsic nature which stops science in its tracks, and thereby 
motivates metaphysics. The excitement to be found in later eliminative materialists about the 
progress science can make when not held back by the obsolete category of “mind”, is entirely 
lacking in Rorty. He did not think “a perfected neurophysiology would tell us anything 
interesting about mind or language” (Rorty 2007: 177), and wondered why philosophers like 
himself should take any interest in the latest scientific developments, when they are “puzzled 
by ends” but “offered information only about means” (ibid.: 100). 
 
Rorty continued this trajectory in 1967 (Rorty 2014: 132ff.) by arguing that the fundamental 
opposition between metaphysicians and analytic philosophers, was that the former think 
metaphysics will make us wise by setting a certain description of the world in stone, while 
the latter invest their hopes in redescribing and recontextualising; as he planned to do with 
consciousness. And then between 1970 and 1972, all the main pieces of his position fell into 
place, as he argued that the notion of prelinguitic awareness of consciousness to which our 
descriptions must answer is untenable (ibid.: 199ff.), that the Cartesian notion of 
consciousness is at the root of modern metaphysical ontology (ibid.: 208ff.), and that 
physicalism should not be construed as finding scientifically acceptable inner causes of 
behaviour to replace Cartesian mental states (ibid.: 290ff.; 299ff.). 
 
The details of Rorty’s position emerge most clearly in five papers that span his career after 
PMN.2 We already know from PMN, that Rorty thinks the modern concept of mind as 
something which presents a contrast with the physical world, arose from two influential 
attempts to solve once pressing, but now obsolete social needs. The first was the need felt by 
the ancient Greeks to find some distinguishing characteristic of humans that accounts for our 
dignity, and raises us above the level of mere animals. Plato’s solution was that we have 
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minds which allow us to think about universal truths, such as those of mathematics, and 
thereby raise ourselves above mundane, particular states of affairs. The second was the need 
felt in the early modern period to make human reason, rather than divine revelation, the 
foundation of knowledge. Descartes’s solution was that all knowledge is built up within the 
conscious mind.3 This innovative conception of mind required Descartes to lump together 
two categories, thoughts and sensations, that had not previously been united; and according to 
Rorty, should never have been. But by bringing sensations upwards to join thoughts in the 
mind, Descartes was able to settle another matter that worried him, namely that the 
mathematical approach of the new science seemed to portray reality as a “a vast web of 
relationships” (Rorty 1993: 401), with no room for the manifest and apparently intrinsic 
qualities we encounter, such as the greenness of a leaf or the taste of an apple. So Descartes 
housed these “secondary” qualities in the mind to save them from the onset of science.  
 
It is this last move which ultimately generated the problem of consciousness as we 
understand it now; what Chalmers calls “the hard problem”. As Rorty sees it, this was due to 
an “unfortunate bit of residual Aristotelianism” on Descartes’s part, which led him to create 
consciousness as “a refuge for Aristotelian notions of substance, essence and intrinsicality” 
(Rorty 1998: 113, 111). It would have been better if he had allowed the new science to sweep 
away all vestiges of intrinsicality. But a residual religious craving for our discourses to be 
guided by something solid and unshakable, led to trust in God being transposed into the 
apparently secular alternative of trust in the independent nature of reality; though in actual 
fact, reality “as it is in itself, apart from human needs and interests” is “just another of the 
obsequious Names of God”. (Rorty 2007: 134). Thus the enlightenment project of attaining 
human self-reliance was left incomplete; Rorty wanted to finish the job. 
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These developments to the concept of mind landed philosophy with a “blur” that has proved 
to be more trouble than it is worth (Rorty 1982a: 325ff.). The resulting concept was a blur 
because it combines distinct epistemological and moral concerns. Epistemologically, the 
mind is supposed to be our first point of contact with the world, and hence essential to our 
status as knowing subjects; this feature was the focus of British Empiricism. And morally, the 
mind is supposed to account for our moral worth, such that people (and other animals, we 
now think) are supposed worthy of moral concern because they are conscious; this feature 
was the focus of German Idealism. These concerns were artificially hitched together by Plato 
and Descartes’s innovations, and the result is that we now have “no ‘intuitions’ about mind as 
such” (ibid.: 325).  
 
Philosophical ontology emerged as both a response to the epistemological problems 
Cartesianism generated – the task being to describe the world in such a way as to undermine 
scepticism – and also as a reaction against the creeping materialism which modern science set 
in motion, and which was thought to devalue us. Thus metaphysics had both epistemological 
and moral motivations, in line with the blur of a concept it worked with. With the advent of 
Darwinism in the nineteenth century, however, the question of the human place in nature had 
been settled in favour of materialism – we were fundamentally like the rest of nature, from 
which we had blindly evolved. This led to two kinds of bad philosophy; the kind that saw 
consciousness as our last hope for specialness, and the kind that embraced materialism, but 
thought we must radically adjust our self-image now we know we are machines. But 
materialism is essentially anti-metaphysical – it makes everything relational. And it is also 
morally benign, because, 
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The secret in the poet’s heart remains unknown to the secret police, despite their 
ability to predict his every thought ... Our inviolable uniqueness lies in our poetic 
ability to say unique and obscure things, not in our ability to say obvious things to 
ourselves alone. (Rorty 1979: 123)4 
 
In the twentieth century, consciousness became an interesting topic again, when Ryle realised 
that we do not have to take consciousness seriously. The reasons why we thought we needed 
to were subsequently dismantled. Thus consciousness was detached from epistemological 
concerns by Sellars’s “Myth of the Given” idea, which showed that nothing we talk about has 
epistemic privilege. And the idea that we have privileged access to subjective states was 
undermined by realising that we have come to think this way only because of a special 
linguistic practice, namely that of according incorrigible status to the noninferential and 
automatic reports we have trained ourselves to make on some of our internal states; this status 
was accorded because such reports are reliable, but was metaphysically blown out of all 
proportion. 
 
This tradition became truly credible when it led to non-reductive physicalism, and hence 
detached itself from both metaphysics and scientism. It achieved this through the realisation 
that reduction is a relation between linguistic items, not ontological categories, and hence that 
the irreducibility of mind is simply a matter of convenience; it remains a useful linguistic tool 
because of the practice of making incorrigible reports, and the complexity of 
neurophysiology – and useful tools will always stick around unless they can be replaced by 
better ones. Philosophers who continue to resist this linguistification of consciousness, by 
insisting on the intrinsically subjective nature of “what it is like” to have an experience, are 
motivated by an essentially religious “ambition of transcendence”; their aim of transcending 
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our current understanding of the world to discover how it really is, is just a “tender-minded 
yearning for an impossible stability and order” (Rorty 1998: 104-5). Since our physical 
understanding of the world is purely relational, then, their yearning attracts them to 
consciousness, for which they have invented a “specifically philosophical game”; the only 
function of which is to “disjoin pain from pain-behaviour” (Rorty 2007: 12). Playing this 
game allows them to imagine “zombies” who are physically identical to us but lack 
consciousness. But zombies that simulate consciousness perfectly are conscious; 
“[s]ufficiently widely accepted simulation is the real thing” (Rorty 1980: 445). 
 
The only way to deny this is to invoke the ineffable. For you can only defend intrinsic, 
nonrelational features, if knowledge of them is not the same as knowledge of how to describe 
them; and for that you need nonlinguistic acquaintance with the ineffable, given that only 
“the ineffable – what cannot be described at all – cannot be described differently” (Rorty 
2007: 118). To resist this kind of pernicious mysticism, you need only invoke a little 
commonsensical verficationalism, while reminding people that exactly the same line now 
taken by defenders of subjectivity, was once taken to defend religious belief. Thus traditional 
theologians argued that to deny God was to fly in the face of common experience, and said 
that theology begins in the acceptance of supernatural events; just as some contemporary 
philosophers say that investigating the mind begins in the common-sense acceptance that 
experience is subjective. Just as the former beliefs died away not because of internal 
theoretical flaws, but rather the attractions of humanist culture, so the latter will die away 
because of the attractions of Rylean physicalism. 
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3. Assessment 
 
The central component of Rorty’s history is bunk; namely that thinking about the mind as an 
internal arena of thoughts and feelings was a social innovation led by philosophers. For 
without the benefit of twentieth century physicalist philosophy, I cannot even begin to 
imagine an alternative way of thinking about the mind (and as we shall see, even physicalist 
philosophy does really not change the situation). To think that our ancestors had a different 
way of looking at the matter is to portray them as inscrutable aliens; but from the documents 
they left, they seem essentially just like us.  
 
Here is an example which shows Rorty is wrong; there are many others I could have used, but 
I think this one is good enough on its own.5 In Homer’s Odyssey, there is a scene where Circe 
the witch transforms some of Odysseus’s companions into pigs. As he puts it, 
 
They had bristles, heads, and voices just like pigs – their bodies looked like swine – 
but their minds were as before, unchanged. In their pens they wept. (Homer, Odyssey, 
10. 313-5; trans. Johnston 2006: 195) 
 
The pigs are weeping, surely, because they are having human thoughts such as “oh no, I’ve 
been turned into a pig”; along with human feelings of despair. They are weeping because 
their conscious minds – their inner thoughts and feelings – are now trapped inside pigs. I 
think it would take some extraordinarily implausible interpretative pyrotechnics to make the 
case that this was not exactly what Homer had in mind; and exactly what innumerable 
generations have immediately thought of when hearing this story. And Homer did not get the 
idea from Plato or Descartes!  
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If that is how people have always thought about consciousness, the back of Rorty’s 
metaphilosophical case is broken. For once we rule out the idea that this way of talking 
emerged because of theoretical concerns about morality or knowledge, we are left with the 
mundane alternative that it emerged simply because thoughts and feelings exist, and so just as 
with other things we encounter in day to day life (like trees), we developed the most 
appropriate way of talking about them we could muster. I think people did rather well with 
the notion of inner subjective events, in fact, given that others can neither hear my thoughts 
nor feel my emotions; given that we dream at night; and given that I can make my experience 
of the tree blurry by closing my eyes a little, while I cannot affect the tree itself in this way. 
Of course our conception of mind has developed over the course of the history of philosophy. 
But it is simply bizarre – and not remotely backed up by the historical documents – to 
suppose that this was not roughly our starting point, from which we could never stray too far 
without thereby ceasing to talk about thoughts and feelings. Why should they be any different 
from trees in this regard?  
  
Now if the supposedly “Cartesian” conception of consciousness is really just a natural way of 
thinking about pre-existing items that Descartes sharpened up,6 then we are committed to the 
idea, which Rorty and like-minded Ryleans pretend to find preposterous, that we are 
conscious before we learn to talk about consciousness. But really, what is so odd about that? 
There are trees before we learn to talk about them. Rorty cites with relish Sellars’s parody of 
this idea: “‘This one,’ this child’s mind says to itself in its private little language, ‘stands out 
clearly. (….) That must be what mother calls ‘red’!’”  (Rorty 2007: 114). Well, I think we can 
all agree that this is not what happens; whoever thought otherwise? But what is supposed to 
be wrong with the idea that after we have learnt to talk about external objects (which we 
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know comes first), we then acquire the sophistication to talk about the inner states that alerted 
us to those objects in the first place, and which were there before we could talk?  
 
Wittgenstein’s private language argument, perhaps (ibid.: 12)? If successful, it would show 
that our words can only latch onto things in the public domain. But expert wine tasters do a 
good job of putting their private sensations into the public domain, and generating 
intersubjective criteria for discussing them; and at a more theoretical level, all those endless 
discussions about qualia in the philosophy journals have done the same thing. Two people 
can stand in front of the same tree and reach intersubjective agreement on how best to 
describe it, and I see no reason why two people having the same kind of private sensations 
should not reach this sort of agreement also. The fact that they cannot see each other’s 
sensations makes no fundamental difference, because each can feel something; and if their 
descriptions of what they can feel are a suitable match (they both try Popping Candy for the 
first time – “did you feel that?”), then they can discourse at leisure about how best to describe 
the experience they are sharing.7 People do this kind of thing all the time, and thereby learn 
about each other’s feelings, while also learning better ways to describe their own. Rorty 
confuses ineffability-to-contemporary-science, with ineffability. 
 
It seems to me that Ryleans have quite a nerve reaching for the intuitive high-ground against 
pre-linguistic consciousness, because their alternative – given the best possible gloss – is that 
consciousness magically arises when we learn to talk, and that prelinguistic babies and dogs 
in pain are simply squeaking like door-hinges.8 That is about as implausible – as distant from 
how people ordinarily think about the world – as a philosophical thesis can possibly get. But 
such a gloss would be misleading, as the most self-aware and consistent Rylean (i.e. Rorty) 
realised, since what the view really amounts to is that there is no consciousness (as 
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commonly understood), only talk about consciousness. And once you see that, you also see 
that it was merely tautologous for Rorty to claim that (talk about) consciousness only arises 
when we first talk about consciousness. Pre-linguistic consciousness becomes a contradiction 
in terms on this conception of “consciousness”, according to which talk about sensations is 
not talk about something, but rather simply talk, with the things we take ourselves to be 
talking about revealed as simply shadows of language. With this idea, we reach the very 
limits of philosophical implausibility. Berkeley got to the same place, albeit from the 
opposite direction, by claiming that there are only experiences of trees, and not really trees; 
that the trees were the shadows of language. 
 
The whole Rylean tradition, right through Place and Armstrong to Dennett, has been 
premised on the idea that when we think about conscious experiences, we are actually 
thinking about behaviour. The tradition started out with Ryle’s idea that this is all we are 
thinking about; but Place could not stomach the notion that our first-person reflections fail to 
latch onto anything solid, and so adjusted the tradition with his idea that our conception of an 
experience is of a generic “something” that is caused by, and in turn, causes, certain kinds of 
behaviour. The tradition has since wavered between going on to say, like Place, that the 
“something” is an inner cause (a brain state), or else that it is an illusory shadow of language; 
the latter being Rorty’s preferred option. And the reason it has wavered, is that our 
conception of a conscious sensation is obviously not just that of a behavioural nexus (with or 
without a categorical basis), because we also form positive conceptions of experiences as 
subjective, private events which feel a certain way; otherwise there never would have been a 
philosophical problem of consciousness. The whole tradition agrees that this specifically 
phenomenal way of thinking about consciousness is illusory, so given that this is all that was 
ever at issue, the distinctions within that tradition are, as Rorty said they were, essentially 
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trivial; Rorty simply preferred to make do without an inner “something”, because he did not 
want philosophers and scientists to be looking for physically respectable replacements for 
conscious states, and hence have them perpetually in hock to the Cartesian tradition.9 
 
For the Rylean tradition, then, when it seems that we are confronted by a private sensation, 
we are actually just making a false judgement. Dennett is refreshingly clear about this, when 
he says that although it may seem to him that he is having a vivid experience, no “such 
‘plenum’ ever came into his mind”; he simply formed the false judgement that it did, in the 
sense that he was disposed to utter a false statement (Dennett 1991: 408). However the 
insurmountable obstacle to taking this line, it seems to me, is that the purportedly false 
judgements will never go away; so given that we are always going to judge that we have 
experiences, the philosophical view that this judgement is mistaken will never be believable.  
 
Prescient as ever, Rorty tried to undermine this line of thought with his Antipodeans thought-
experiment (Rorty 1979: chapter 2; see also Rorty 2014: 204). These imaginary people refer 
directly to their brain states, and having never been infected by the Cartesian tradition, they 
consequently have no dispositions to make false judgements to the effect that they undergo 
subjective experiences; they first heard about this latter idea from us humans, and find it 
thoroughly baffling. Rorty thinks that we could in principle become just like them. However, 
this example backfired because Kenneth Gallagher (1985), in one of the most conclusive 
rebuttals of a philosophical argument I have seen, showed that the Antipodeans would 
actually have to be just like us. Gallagher’s essential point is that even if Antipodean children 
learn to say “my c-fibres are firing” rather than “that hurts”, when they graze their knees, they 
would still notice a massive difference between this way of thinking about c-fibres, and what 
they would later learn when they came to study neuroscience. Seeing the apparent 
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irreconcilability between their objective and subjective conceptions of c-fibres, then, they 
would be landed with the same problem of consciousness as us; whenever they hurt 
themselves, they would judge that their c-fibres were presenting themselves in a special, 
private way; and Rylean philosophers would have to insist, against all odds, that those 
judgements are false.10  
 
Note that the situation for Ryleans is quite unlike Rorty’s favourite example of a once 
implausible thesis which became accepted as common sense, namely the Copernican 
revolution. For once you know the Sun does not really pass over the Earth, and that it simply 
looks like that because we are rotating, you retain no inclination to judge that the Sun is going 
around the Earth. You know it is not, but you also know what it looks like, and hence why 
people once thought otherwise; you understand the inclination to make a false judgement, but 
you do not have it. In the Rylean case, however, you are not being told to interpret your 
experience differently, but rather that you do not have any experience; the false judgement is 
not one made on the basis of experience, but rather one based on no experience. The 
inclination to make these false judgements will never go away, then, so long as we seem to 
feel and think things; which of course we always will. Given that the false judging cannot 
actually be the experiencing, otherwise it would not be false (I suspect that confusion in this 
area lends the position a false sense of stability in the minds of some of its advocates), we end 
up with a position which is unfalsifiable from a third-person perspective, and unbelievable 
from a first-person perspective. But if the position were correct, and hence there were no 
first-person perspective, then it ought to be believable; we ought to be able to lose our 
inclination to make false judgements. Even the Antipodeans cannot do that, however. 
 
18 
 
Rorty likes to talk about usefulness, so let us follow suit. He thinks the concept of 
consciousness his opponents apply is useless; that it serves no purpose except to set up 
unverifiable differences between us and zombies, and thus provoke pointless debates. But is 
it really pointless to distinguish us from physical replicas that lack consciousness, assuming 
such things are possible?11 It seems to me that the distinction serves a crucial explanatory 
function. Human sex- and drug-addicts have an obvious motivation which explains their 
behaviour: they are trying to get “that feeling”, again and again. They cannot get enough of it. 
But what would their zombie equivalents be up to? A zombie teenage boy locked away in his 
bedroom with a pornographic image would be engaged in completely inexplicable behaviour. 
But add the consciousness, and we all know why his human counterpart is doing that: for the 
internal fireworks that Ryleans are seriously telling us do not exist! Or to raise the tone 
somewhat, why would zombie gourmets rave about expensive food, when cheaper and more 
nutritious alternatives are readily available, as they are in our physically identical world? Or 
ride rollercoasters, listen to music, or visit art galleries? In short, large numbers of activities 
undertaken in the zombie world would not make much sense; despite their making perfect 
sense in our world, where consciousness experiences can be invoked to explain them.12  
 
Let us take this into the political arena, which is something else Rorty would approve of. He 
thinks there is no moral or political significance to the question of whether we are conscious 
in a way that a machine designed to be behaviourally indistinguishable would not be (or at 
least, could not be known to be, in the absence of a mechanistic understanding of subjective 
experience). He says,  
 
I cannot see how the question would come up unless one thought that the question of 
whether foetuses, or illiterate slaves, have rights is to be answered by figuring out 
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whether they contain ineffable whatsis called “subjectivity” or “personhood”. Those 
who do think so hope that metaphysics will guide us when we make moral and 
political decisions. This hope strikes me as pathetic. (Rorty 2000: 108) 
 
Rorty’s readers might be mistaken for thinking this hope is anything but pathetic, given that 
he spent so much of his time arguing that the notion of conscious subjectivity, which has 
evidently played a leading role in arguments about abortion, vegetarianism, and the like, was 
a product of metaphysics. However, his wider point is that the concept of consciousness will 
not help us in the moral and political sphere; that its invocation is an unnecessary and 
counterproductive red herring. That cannot be right. 
 
In Joshua Oppenheimer’s extraordinary 2012 documentary film, The Act of Killing, the mass 
murderer and torturer Anwar Congo is cleverly led by Oppenheimer to re-enact his brutal acts 
for the camera; he displays a certain pride and wry amusement in this. In the climax of the 
film, however, Oppenheimer gets Congo to reverse roles with one of his associates, so that 
Congo is now playing the blindfolded one facing imminent death. He is exposed to the same 
situation, and consequent feelings, that he had perpetrated on his many victims; although it is 
not as bad, as Oppenheimer points out to him, since he is not actually facing death. Congo 
breaks down under the enormity of it all. Almost unbelievably (practically nothing is 
unbelievable by this point in the film), it seems he had not thought of it like this before; he 
had not thought about what it was like for his victims. Placed in their position, however, he is 
directly confronted by the kind of first-person perspective they would have had on the 
situations he placed them within. And that is what he cannot bear. If he had continued to take 
a third-person stance, viewing his victims as machines squeaking like door hinges, then he 
might never have been morally affected. But by employing the “Cartesian” conception of 
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consciousness – which Rorty would have us believe somehow found its way from Western 
philosophy into Indonesian culture, so as to infiltrate this thoroughly unsophisticated man – 
Congo grasps the terribleness of what he has done. 
 
Rorty is very keen on hermeneutic engagement with unfamiliar perspectives (Rorty 1979), 
and the moral potential of novels to expand our empathy by telling sad stories which 
“sensitize one to the pain of those who do not speak our language” (Rorty 1989: 94); he even 
approvingly quotes Kundera saying that novels are what safeguard our “right to an inviolable 
private life” (ibid.: viii). What Rorty does not seem to have realised is that his philosophy of 
consciousness ran exactly counter to this agenda. For there is no more powerful and vivid 
way to empathise with another person, than by imagining yourself into their conscious 
perspective; by thinking about what it is like for them. If Congo had done that, he would not 
have found life as a torturer so carefree. And yet Rorty’s philosophy of consciousness tells us 
that this way of thinking is an illusion; he discourages it. 
 
I think we are currently at a cultural crossroads in our thinking about consciousness. Rorty 
captured something of the zeitgeist, in that many educated people are now increasingly 
inclined to think about consciousness in an exclusively third-person way, most typically as a 
type of computer programme. However I do not think this is due to the influence of Rylean 
philosophy , but rather the fact that science dominates our culture to a greater extent than ever 
before; the simple thought is that science says what everything is, so it must say what 
consciousness is.13 And since science is well on the way to making machines that look like 
they are conscious, people will accept that they are conscious; and also have no qualms about 
enhancing their own consciousness with transhumanist technologies. We face a world in 
which people envisage uploading their minds onto the internet so they can live forever.  
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An extreme manifestation of this trend is provided by the enduring popularity – which never 
ceases to amaze me – of Derek Parfit’s conception of personal identity (Parfit 1984). If you 
put aside our first-person conception of consciousness, then Parfit’s idea that we might travel 
by stepping into a teletransportation machine – which obliterates us and then creates a 
physical replica in another place – is unproblematic. So if (and this is effectively the same 
situation) a replica of me were to suddenly appear by my side, and I am obliged to kill one of 
us, I am invited to consider it a matter of indifference whether I turn the gun on myself or my 
replica; since he has an indistinguishable third-person consciousness. And people happily go 
along with this (I have witnessed it on numerous occasions), despite the fact if the appearance 
of the replica were accompanied by an unbearable pain (in their “original” body), they would 
immediately transfer the pain to the replica if given the option –  and pain cessation is 
obviously a less grave matter than death in this situation. The pain would force them to 
engage in first-person reflection (as would the real prospect of death); and yet in their studies, 
so to speak, people go along with Parfit. How has such a crazy view come to seem plausible? 
Because an extreme faith in science blinds people to what they already know. And “faith” 
must be the right word, since if they thought there were even an outside possibility that they 
would be committing suicide, they would not even say that they would consider turning the 
gun on themselves. 
 
If this conception of consciousness as something you look at from the outside continues to 
gain acceptance, we will end up in a stupid and even more selfish world. For we will no 
longer think about the first-person experiences of others; but will continue to think of our 
own consciousness this way – because this conception is forced upon us in our own case, but 
not that of the other. In our own case, we have no alternative; and the Rylean tradition has not 
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provided one, since the false judgements it insists upon will inevitably take place in the 
“apparent” presence of consciousness. The intellectual accoutrement of telling yourself that 
you are making a false judgement will not get in the way of worrying about your own 
perspective (false judgement or not), but it might confirm your inclination to disregard that of 
other people. Though I share Rorty’s lack of faith in the ability of metaphysics to settle 
political and moral matters, it can have influence; and stifling the Rylean tradition, while 
promoting the legitimacy of our first-person conception of consciousness, strikes me as a step 
in the right direction. This is already well underway; the emergence of Chalmers onto the 
scene marked a turning point, I think. He is no frock-coated fogey, which is the image anti-
physicalists once had, and placed in the context of the discussions he has sparked off in both 
science and philosophy, Rylean materialism is now starting to look dated; which is a good 
sign when it comes to hopes of cultural influence. 
 
Finally, let us talk about motivation: Rorty’s favourite arena of discourse on this topic. 
Rorty’s motivation is clear. He thinks that, as John Caputo nicely puts it, Kant’s so-called 
Copernican Revolution “substantially undid the real Copernican Revolution” (Caputo 2013: 
135), by placing the Cartesian notion of mind at the centre of reality; when Copernicus had 
shown the way to a purely scientific conception of reality in which we are not at the centre of 
things in any sense. In doing so, Kant preserved the notion of an intrinsic nature of reality 
about which we might discover the objective truth, and this lingering, quasi-religious loyalty 
to truth gets in the way of what Rorty wants; namely a world in which everything we say, we 
take responsibility for. This would be a better world, because without loyalty to truth, only to 
each other, scientists would no longer feel obliged to find out what happens when you split 
the atom, or test IQ across racial groups; we could decide, as a matter of cultural politics, not 
to pursue these descriptions. 
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I think some of the outcomes Rorty envisages are good, but he is looking at things in entirely 
the wrong way. Truth itself is not the issue; there are innumerable objective truths which the 
world forces us to accept whether we like it or not. The issue is the motivations which drive 
people to invest effort in discovering some of these truths rather than others; and that is 
something we need to get some rational control over if we are to survive and prosper. Getting 
rid of the concept of consciousness will not rid us of truth; it will simply make us blind to 
certain truths, and encourage a developing situation in which all truth is thought to reside in 
science. Which brings us to the gaping lacuna in Rorty’s non-ontological physicalism: for if 
the world is not essentially physical, why should it be that (to quote Jackson again), “if you 
duplicate our world in all physical respects and stop right there, you duplicate it in all 
respects”? Why should it be that physics can predict “every event in every space-time region” 
(Rorty 1979: 28)? Ontological physicalists can give the obvious answer; but since Rorty 
thinks reality has no intrinsic nature, and can be described in any way that suits us, the ability 
of a physical, as opposed to any other, form of description to be all-encompassing, becomes 
an inexplicable mystery on his account – athletic or economic descriptions would not work, 
after all. And he ended up in this situation, I think, because he went along with the agenda of 
metaphysical scientism that dominated Anglo-American philosophy in the twentieth century; 
simply because of his hunch that anything presented as an obstacle to physical description 
must have something to do with religion. 
 
Rorty’s continual invocation of religion as a hammer to batter his opponents with reminds me 
of the classic episode of Fawlty Towers, in which on hearing that some German tourists are 
coming to stay at his hotel, Basil runs around reminding everyone not to “mention the war”; 
despite the fact that nobody apart from him has the slightest inclination to do so. For I 
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struggle to detect any religious motivation whatsoever in philosophers like Searle, simply on 
account of their insistence on taking a first-person perspective on consciousness; but that 
would not matter to Rorty, who used the historical influence of religion as an unfalsifiable 
explainer of practically any source of opposition to his views. For Rorty was obsessed with 
religion – just like Nietzsche – and projected this obsession onto everyone else. Because of 
his obsession, he bought into a tradition stemming from Comte, according to which all 
vestiges of religion must be eradicated from our world-view and replaced with pure science. 
But unlike the other Ryleans who followed on a crusade against consciousness, Rorty did not 
believe in science either; he was so obsessed with religion that even scientific truth was too 
religious for him. Thinking in vain that he could detach Ryleanism from metaphysics, then, 
he signed up to what is essentially a programme of radically revisionary, scientistic 
metaphysics.  
 
However, I do think Rorty was right to detect a connection between consciousness and 
religion, since reflection on consciousness can lead into religious hypotheses of transcendent 
existence; this kind of thing is to be found throughout the history of philosophy. But the 
crucial point is that it does not have to (see Tartaglia 2016); Rorty’s obsession with religion 
led him to reject consciousness because he could not stomach even the mere possibility. This 
led him to neglect his own insight that the “fact that the vast majority of our beliefs must be 
true will … guarantee the existence of the vast majority of the things we now think we are 
talking about” (Rorty 1982b: 14). My final assessment, then, is that Rorty’s philosophy of 
consciousness is indeed – as Strawson says of consciousness eliminitivism generally – silly; 
though it is considerably more self-aware than the other versions. But the self-aware and 
original bit, Rorty’s metaphilosophy of consciousness, is simply wrong.14 
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Further Reading 
Rorty, R. (1982) ‘Contemporary Philosophy of Mind’, Synthese, 53: 323-48. In endnote 2, I 
list the five papers which (in addition to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature) are the main 
sources for Rorty’s views on consciousness; but if I had to choose only one, this would be it. 
 
Tartaglia, J. (2016) Philosophy in a Meaningless Life: A System of Nihilism, Consciousness 
and Reality, London: Bloomsbury. For a completely different line on consciousness and its 
metaphilosophical significance to the one which Rorty takes, have a look at my new book. 
 
Chalmers, D. (1996) The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. This is the 
contemporary classic in the philosophy of mind, which set the agenda for all those 
discussions about zombies and the ‘hard problem’. The start of the book, where Chalmers 
sets up the issues impeccably, is rather more interesting than the later stuff, where (to my 
mind, at least) he goes off the rails. Compare and contrast Rorty and Chalmers on the 
question of whether photoelectric cells (Rorty) and thermostats (Chalmers) are conscious!  
 
Dennett, D. (1991) Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown and Company. The main 
source for a contemporary Rylean theory of consciousness; unlike Rorty’s, it is inspired by 
science rather than historical metaphilosophy. Rorty’s glowing review (‘Blunder around for a 
while’; listed in the ‘References’ section of this essay) is revealing about his own stance. 
 
Ryle, G. (1949 / 2000) The Concept of Mind, London: Penguin. This is where Rorty’s 
physicalist philosophy of mind ultimately comes from. 
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Nagel, T. (1974) ‘What is it like to be a bat?’, Philosophical Review, 82: 435-450. This 
classic, which ironically enough took the bat example from a Rylean behaviourist (B.A. 
Farrell), threw a spanner into the Rylean physicalist works which I doubt will ever be 
extracted. 
 
Searle, J. (1992) The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Searle’s despair 
at the Rylean physicalist tradition knows no bounds; the first two chapters will be of most 
interest to students of Rorty. 
 
Rorty, R. and Searle, J. (1999) ‘Rorty v. Searle, at last: a debate’, Logos: A Journal of 
Catholic Thought and Culture, 2: 20-67. Unfortunately they discuss truth rather than 
consciousness; but it is nevertheless fascinating to witness this clash of the titans, and what 
they say can be readily applied to the topic at hand. 
 
Tartaglia, J. (2007) Rorty and the Mirror of Nature, London: Routledge. In this guidebook to 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, I explain at length Rorty’s ‘fast dissolution’ of the 
mind-problem, his attempt to deconstruct its history, and his ‘Antipodeans’ thought-
experiment. 
 
Malachowski, A. (ed.) (2002) Richard Rorty: Sage Masters in Modern Social Thought, 
London: Sage. This expensive four-volume set is great to use if your library stocks it; it 
contains many key works on Rorty’s philosophy of mind, including the important Kenneth 
Gallagher article I cite in my essay. If your library instead stocks my derivative version, 
called Richard Rorty: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers (Routledge 2009), then 
that will work too. 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1 If he had said this, his position would have been strikingly close to Collingwood’s. 
2 ‘Contemporary Philosophy of Mind’ (Rorty 1982a); ‘Non-Reductive Physicalism’ (Rorty 
1991b); ‘Consciousness, Intentionality, and Pragmatism’ (Rorty 1993); ‘Daniel Dennett on 
Intrinsicality’ (Rorty 1998); ‘Cultural Politics and the Question of the Existence of God’ 
(Rorty 2007).  
3 Although Descartes is invariably the philosopher Rorty mentions in this regard, he 
apparently considered him to have been mainly just a compiler of extant ideas, rather than an 
original thinker; see Geuss 2008. 
4 Note the elitism in this statement; consciousness makes everyone unique, not just ‘poets’. 
5 I could have talked about the Egyptians, for instance; see MacDonald 2003. 
6 Descartes was in a position to sharpen it up, it seems to me, because he was of a generation 
which supposed that science was able to mathematically describe the entire physical world; in 
earlier times, the idea that feelings might reside in the physical world would not have seemed 
so problematic. 
7 Imaginative sceptical hypotheses must be put aside; but these would cause just as much 
trouble for attempts to agree on the nature of the tree. I say that switching from trees to 
sensations makes no ‘fundamental’ difference, because privacy is an obstacle to scientific 
description; which is the worry at the root of this position. Also note that I make no claim to 
knowing what Wittgenstein had in mind (generations of scholars have failed to agree on that), 
only what Rorty did; and the problem with that argument is that if our private sensations can 
play no role in what we say about them, then why should it be that we spontaneously and 
autonomously say the same kind of things? Try Popping Candy, if you have not already, and 
I bet you will describe the consequent sensations roughly as I did. 
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8 Pain is a conversational complement we reserve for attractive animals only, as Rorty (at his 
most unguarded) once argued (Rorty 1979: 173). 
9 A variant on this tradition emerged in the 1990s, which tried to reconcile it with 
phenomenal concepts by claiming that they are based on the intrinsic nature of our brain 
states (Loar 1997). As you might expect, the result was incoherent; see Tartaglia 2013. For an 
account of why physicalism always ends up in the same place, see Tartaglia 2016: chapter 4. 
10 I am rather more careful (perhaps unnecessarily) about what Gallagher’s argument shows 
in Tartaglia 2007: 83-5. 
11 As Chalmers assumes; if you reject this assumption (perhaps on the grounds that we 
currently lack an adequate physical account of consciousness, and that this might show that 
certain physical conditions necessitate consciousness), then simply think of zombies as 
behaviourally identical to us in what follows. 
12 Rorty would presumably respond that the zombies’ behaviour is explained by the fact that 
they are physically identical to us, and hence make the same false judgements. But then if the 
judgements really are false, the question becomes: why do we act in these ways? 
13 If Rylean philosophy were more widely known and understood, I suspect that its 
implausibility would tend to produce the opposite effect. 
14 For my own views on all of these matters, see Tartaglia 2016. 
